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Paradigms in the study of creativity: Introducing the perspective of cultural psychology 
 
Vlad Petre Glăveanu 
London School of Economics 
 
 
This article identifies three paradigms in creativity theory and research in psychology. The He-paradigm, 
focused on the solitary genius, has been followed, mainly after the 1950s, by the I-paradigm, equally 
individualistic in nature but attributing creativity to each and every individual. Extending this view, the We-
paradigm incorporates what became known as the social psychology of creativity. The cultural psychology of 
creativity builds upon this last theoretical approach while being critical of some of its assumptions. This 
relatively new perspective, using the conceptual and methodological framework of cultural psychology, 
investigates the sociocultural roots and dynamics of all our creative acts and employs a tetradic framework of 
self – community – new artifact – existing artifacts in its conceptualization of creativity. The theoretical basis 
of the cultural psychology approach is analyzed as well as some of its main implications for both the 
understanding and study of creativity. 
 
Keywords: He I and We-paradigms, Social psychology of creativity, Cultural psychology of creativity, 
Vygotskian approach, Potential space, Dialogicality, Symbolic resources 
 
 
We undoubtedly live in a world of change, a world in motion. It is change that takes place at all 
levels, that seems to get hold of every aspect of our life and our society. We feel it in the accelerated 
daily rhythm at work and at home, we perceive its consequences in the political and economical 
domain and see its impact for the natural environment. This generalized sense of change often leads 
to anxiety (Negus & Pickering, 2004), to the feeling that we are not “prepared”, that what we 
normally know and do doesn’t work anymore. It is under these circumstances that creativity 
becomes much more present and more important that before (Runco, 2004) and it is claimed to help 
us achieve our goals as individuals, as organizations, as societies (Westwood & Low, 2003). At the 
same time, the aura of panacea creativity has gained pushes it more than ever under the scrutiny of 
psychologists and social scientists at large.  
 
The number of ways in which creativity has been theorized and the variety of domains it has been 
applied to is impressive (for reviews see Sternberg, 2003; Runco, 2004): from behavioral 
approaches linking it to reinforcement and modeling (Epstein & Laptosky, 1999) to the dominant 
cognitive approaches discussing it in terms of cognitive style (Martinsen & Kaufmann, 1999) or 
problem solving (Weisberg, 1988). Primary areas of application for creativity theories are in 
educational settings (Cropley, 1999; Hennessey, 2003a) and organizations, especially studies of 
leadership (Mumford & Connelly, 1999) and performance in heterogeneous teams (Puccio, 1999). 
 
In most of these areas it is the individual set apart from his/her social context that constitutes the 
unit of analysis for creativity, an authentic bias in the literature recognized only from the ‘70s on 
(Hennessey, 2003b). Be it the “lone genius” or the more “ordinary” person, s/he creates outside of 
social and group factors (Paulus & Nijstad, 2003) and even despite them (Weiner, 2000). Society 
and culture repeatedly act as the “villains” the creator fights against and this generates a series of 
paradoxes that will be exposed further on in this article. One of them relates directly to the definition 
of creativity. “New” and “useful” as features of a creative product (Stein, 1953; Martindale, 1994; 
Richards, 1999) are properties that easily describe the work of great creators and can be applied to 
certain products, particularly in the field of science, art and technology, but deny the creativity of 
children and the varied instances of “mundane creativity” (Cohen & Ambrose, 1999).     
    
This article aims to unpack the social and cultural nature of creative acts. In doing so I will start by 
distinguishing between three paradigms that led creativity theory and research, the He, I and We 
paradigm (see also Glăveanu, in press). The first part will therefore focus on paradigmatic shifts 
from “positivistic research paradigms to more complex, constructivistic, systems-oriented research 
models” (Friedman & Rogers, 1998, p. xviii). Nonetheless, it will be argued that even the models 
proposed within what is currently considered the social psychology of creativity, maybe “the least 
developed area in creativity research” (Amabile, 1996, p. 264), can still be criticized for the 
individualism hidden behind their assumptions. Counteracting such tendencies, an emerging 
multidisciplinary field is introduced, the cultural psychology of creativity, conceiving creativity as a 
fundamentally relational, intersubjective phenomenon.  
 
1. Three paradigms of creativity theory and research  
 
The study of creativity has known three paradigmatic stages: the genius stage, the creative person 
stage and the “social” stage. By making reference to historical times long before the words 
“creativeness” or “creativity” entered our vocabulary (for the English language this is the 18th and 
19th century respectively; see Mason, 2003; Weiner, 2000) or before psychology became a science, 
the article will also consider centuries of pre-psychological thought concerning humans’ capacity to 
create. Although a historical progression is implied, it is likely that “instances” of these paradigms 
coexist at different times and they are certainly intertwined in today’s scientific landscape.    
 
1.1. The He-paradigm: the lone genius 
 
The image of the genius is probably one of the most persistent representations in human history. 
With roots in Greek and Roman antiquity, the first links to be made were those between genius and 
divine inspiration (Friedman & Rogers, 1998; Sternberg, 2003). Yet, the Latin origins and meaning 
of genius as a guardian spirit have changed in the following centuries (Negus & Pickering, 2004). 
One turning point is considered by most to be the Renaissance (Montuori & Purser, 1995), when the 
influence of God started to be replaced by that of genetic inheritance (Dacey, 1999). This process of 
individualization of the genius continued on two different fronts: arts and the exaltation of 
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imagination during Romanticism and sciences and the exaltation of reason during Enlightenment 
(Weiner, 2000). Embracing such ideas about unique individuals, the He-paradigm, or the paradigm 
of the genius, has put considerable emphasis in describing creators on two main features: exclusivity 
and disconnection. Creativity is from this perspective “exclusivist” because only few are chosen for 
it (initially by God, later on by their biology), and the very few that are must, as a prerequisite, stand 
apart from the masses because of their capacities. They create ex-nihilo (Negus & Pickering, 2004) 
and therefore need nothing to tie them up to the world of others or existing knowledge. The He-
paradigm, (“He” since the creator is most often a male other), thus takes the strongest individualistic 
stance in the conceptualization of creativity.   
 
Undoubtedly the father-figure of the “modern” He-paradigm, Francis Galton offered the world 
through his 1869 “Hereditary Genius” the first scientific study of the creative genius (Simonton, 
2003). His assumption was that in the “competition between nature and nurture”, when all 
conditions are equal, “nature certainly proves the stronger of the two” (Galton, 1874, p. 16). By this 
Galton took genius out of the mists of the supernatural and gave it a solid basis: human biology. He 
also described it in terms of intellectual ability and eminence (Terman, 1947/1970). While 
intellectual ability has to do with the creator’s individual brain, there is a factor of social reputation 
in appreciating eminence. Nevertheless, the connection to the world of previous knowledge and the 
scientific (or artistic) communities is not understood here as interdependence but as the mere effect 
of the genius on the existing social and cultural structures. Therefore, creativity in this paradigm 
refers strictly to the highest levels of creation, or what is known as historical creativity (Boden, 
1994; Fischer et al., 2005). The only things worthy of being called creative are those that introduce 
novelties, that generate new schools of thought, and constitute landmarks in the history of a domain, 
sometimes even the history of humanity.  
 
This represents the main limitation but also the main attraction of the He-paradigm. By glorying 
creative breakthroughs it makes creativity stand among the most desirable human capacities, 
however at the price of cutting off ordinary creativity (Bateson, 1999) and common creative 
experiences (Stein, 1953). Its focus has traditionally been on the study of the Great Man, especially 
eminent scientists, and this branch of investigation has only grown in the last decades (although the 
emphasis on the biological basis of genius was not always kept). Examples are found in the work of 
Roe (1952/1970) who examined eminent US scientists to build an “average” profile of their 
characteristics. The studies of Gardner (1994) on seven “creators of the modern era”, each taken as 
an embodiment of a certain types of intelligence, have led to similar descriptions of the 
psychological profile and life-path of Exemplary Creators. But researches on scientific genius soon 
started to be questioned for their implicit assumptions. In such a critical enterprise, Schaffer (1994) 
argued against the mythologies of the genius or what she calls the “culture hero” and the “fetishism” 
of discovery. Both scientific discoveries and their authors are “made up” or socially constructed by 
subsequent generations through processes of retrospection and celebration.  
 
In concluding, the He-paradigm, based on the individuality, insight, outstanding ability and fertility 
of the genius (Mason, 2003), gives an elitist and essentialist account of creativity (Negus & 
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Pickering, 2004). The direct consequence of this is that it detaches the creator from community and, 
by this, ends up building a pathological image of him/her. As Montuori and Purser (1995, p. 76) 
argue, the fate of the genius is often represented as that of a person who is misunderstood, eccentric 
and even anti-social. Such an account also excludes the role of co-creation or collaboration in the 
process of reaching “great discoveries” (Barron, 1999). Its implications go above the scientific and 
also reach the ideological since recognizing or not the “genius” is often a highly politically-charged 
action (Negus & Pickering, 2004). In the end, it rarely is creativity alone that decides who is a 
genius but institutional structures reflecting power relations between and within social groups.     
 
1.2. The I-paradigm: the creative person 
  
If the He-paradigm has deep roots in pre-psychological thought, the I-paradigm largely emerged 
once psychologists started to focus on creativity. Put simply, the paradigmatic shift replaced the 
genius with the “normal” person while keeping the individual as a unit of analysis. It is what can be 
referred to as a “democratization” of creativity (Bilton, 2007; Hulbeck, 1945; Weiner, 2000). 
Everyone is capable of being creative since it is no longer a capacity of the few chosen by God, 
biology or unique psychological features. With this shift, the use of the term genius declined leaving 
space for notions like gifted and creative (Friedman & Rogers, 1998). The birth of the I-paradigm 
and its new terminology was affected by forces working from within the field of psychology and 
also from the outside: the socio-political context in the US after the Second World War.    
  
“In the presence of the Russian threat, ‘creativity’ could no longer be left to the chance 
occurrences of the genius; neither could it be left in the realm of the wholly mysterious and 
the untouchable. Men had to be able to do something about it; creativity had to be a property 
in many men; it had to be something identifiable; it had to be subject to the effects of efforts 
to gain more of it” (Razik, 1967/1970, p. 156). 
 
It was the background of an individualistic society that gave the perfect context for the emergence of 
the I-paradigm. As shown by Slater (1991), the Individual versus Society worldview is predominant 
in America. This myth is associated with the dream of escaping the influence of the outside society 
and culture seen as entities one can connect to and disconnect from (p. 154).  
 
In psychology the voice behind the I-paradigm was that of Guilford, remembered here for his 
historical APA presidential address in 1950. While calling the attention of psychologists to the topic 
of creativity, he also gave them a clear agenda: “the psychologist’s problem is that of creative 
personality” (p.  444) and “creative acts can therefore be expected, no matter how feeble or how 
infrequent, of almost all individuals” (p. 446). And Guilford’s message was heard; for the following 
decades psychologists looked intensively for the personal attributes of individuals (personality, 
intelligence, etc.) and their link to creativity (Amabile, 1996). 
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Unsurprisingly then, in 1981, when Barron and Harrington published a review of creativity studies, 
they offered it the title “Creativity, intelligence, and personality”.  More recent literature argues that 
intelligence is not a sufficient condition for creativity (Eysenck, 1994) and therefore intelligent 
persons are not necessarily creative as well. Nevertheless, intelligence and creativity overlap in 
some respects but not in others (Sternberg, 1999). One hypothesis may be that, instead of a single 
outstanding intelligence, the creative person is described by an unusual combination of intelligences 
(Gardner, 1994). Studies of the creative personality on the other hand proved to be an even more 
fertile tradition. Among the most common traits encountered were: tolerance for ambiguity and 
orientation towards the future (Stein, 1953), independence of judgment, preference for complexity, 
strong desire to create, deep motivation, lots of personal troubles, strong intuitive nature and 
patience (Barron, 1999), relatively high intelligence, originality, articulateness and verbal fluency, 
and a good imagination (Tardif & Sternberg, 1988). Finally, also within the I-paradigm, a special 
class of studies locates creativity not in the individual’s personality but in his/her unconscious and 
acts of sublimation (see Freud, 1908/1970; Noppe, 1999), or even in pathology (see Storr, 1972; 
Eysenck, 1994; Richards, 1999). Perhaps the most prominent manifestation of the I-paradigm 
though can be found in cognitive studies looking at processes of “creative cognition” (see for 
example Ward et al., 1999). What all these diverse approaches have in common is their attempt to 
relate creativity to something from within the psychology of the person. 
 
Along with advances in theoretical models, the I-paradigm was also fruitful for research 
methodology (see Mayor, 1999). Psychometric approaches flourished, most creativity tests being 
developed to measure divergent thinking and problem-solving abilities (Sternberg, 2003; Barron and 
Harrington, 1981). In the spirit of the I-paradigm, these tests were validated on and applied to non-
eminent persons (Runco, 2004) but remained open to criticism since they looked at the end-product 
and not the creative process behind it (Barron & Harrington, 1981). Overall, taking into account 
both theory and research methods, it could be said that the I-paradigm largely encouraged 
methodological reductionism (Montuori & Purser, 1997) by focusing on intrapsychic processes to 
the exclusion of other levels. This generated partial theoretical models that explore individual 
cognition and personality in a social vacuum and conceptualize creativity as a quality of the lone 
individual. The critique of this decontextualized view led to the emergence of the We-paradigm.       
   
1.3. The We-paradigm: towards a social psychology of creativity  
 
Driven by an attributional error commonly described in psychology, both laypeople and researchers 
generally attribute creativity to creators’ internal dispositions ignoring nondispositional influences 
(Kasof, 1999, p. 156). Several notable attempts have been made to correct this error in recent 
decades by initiating the first research programs to investigate the role of social factors in the 
creative process (Amabile, 1996). Along with these a new vocabulary emerged, one bringing to the 
front terms such as social creativity, the creativity that is the result of human interaction and 
collaboration (Purser & Montuori, 2000), and showing a renewed interest in group creativity 
(Paulus et al., 1999; Nemeth at al., 2003; Paulus & Nijstad, 2003). In short, the We-paradigm 
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ambitiously aims to “put the social back” (Hennessey, 2003a, p. 184) into the theory of creativity 
and starts from the assumption that “creativity takes place within, is constituted and influenced by, 
and has consequences for, a social context” (Westwood & Low, 2003, p. 236). Rejecting atomistic 
and positivistic standpoints and adopting more holistic and systemic ways of looking at creativity, 
the psychologists promoting the We-paradigm acknowledge the social nature of creativity (Purser & 
Montuori, 2000), a process that spurs out of transactions between self and others, self and 
environment (Stein, 1975).  
 
However, although formally the social psychology of creativity has been proposed as such by 
Teresa Amabile since the beginning of the ‘80s, much of the work done within it still endorses a 
vision of the social that corresponds more to individualistic paradigms than to a truly social 
perspective. In making this claim I rely on Marková’s (2003) discussion of external Ego-Alter 
relationships envisioning self and other, the individual and the social, as two distinct units. This kind 
of conceptualization, common to modern social psychology (Farr, 1996), ends up portraying the 
social as an external environment, a set of stimulations that facilitate or constrain the creative act 
(the “press” factor; Rhodes, 1961, cited in Runco, 2004), and therefore remains oblivious to the 
social roots, social dynamics and social functions of creativity.   
 
For example, Amabile’s social psychology of creativity grants social factors a “crucial role in 
creative performance” (1996, p. 6). In her extensive work she, along with collaborators, used a 
variety of methods to investigate the role of intrinsic motivation in creativity. Their conclusion, 
important for the psychology of creativity in general, is formalized as the Intrinsic Motivation 
Principle of Creativity, and states that intrinsic motivation, or doing something for its own sake, is 
generally associated with increased creativity, while extrinsic motivation, or the motivation to do 
something for an external goal, often leads to a decrease in creative performance (Amabile, 1996; 
Hennessey, 2003a). The role of motivation is reflected in Amabile’s componential model of 
creativity comprising domain-relevant skills, creativity-relevant skills, and task motivation. 
Considering the above, a legitimate question arises: where is the social in this model? 
Disappointingly, the answer offered is that, “largely because they affect motivation, social factors 
can have a powerful impact on creativity” (Amabile, 1996, p. 3). This is in tone with the declared 
aim of Amabile’s social psychology of creativity, “to identify particular social and environmental 
conditions that can positively or negatively influence the creativity of most individuals” (p. 5). 
Consequently, the discussion of the social in her book is constantly framed in terms of choice and 
constraints, reward, competition, modeling, stimulation, evaluation, peer pressure, surveillance, etc. 
and therefore does not abandon the understanding of creativity as an individual-level phenomenon 
“conditioned” by social factors.  
 
Other accounts informing the social psychology of creativity depart from the study of the individual 
and focus on larger societal contexts. Using impressive collections of data about creative persons 
throughout history and quantifying aspects of the social world and the personal life of the creators, 
D.K. Simonton (1975, 1976, 1999) reached several interesting conclusions about the way in which 
social, cultural, political and economic factors impact on creativity. His ample and fertile research, 
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“the largest systematic program of research in the social psychology of creativity” (Amabile, 1996, 
p. 213), used historiometry as a nomothetic approach to creativity. Although appealing for the rigor 
of its procedures, this specific methodology greatly influences the choice and selection of subjects, 
as well as on the nature of the conclusions. Suitable for a historiometric analysis, Simonton (1988) 
focused on scientific geniuses and, more generally, on “great” creative achievements to the 
exclusion of more common forms of creativity (something specific to the He-paradigm). 
Furthermore, the nomothetic orientation aims to unravel general patterns and correlations between 
factors at the cost of understanding the individual circumstances of the creators.  
 
From the two accounts above it becomes clear that what a social psychology of creativity would 
need is to be able to bring together both individuals and societal structures. Systemic models of 
creativity represent, from this perspective, perhaps the greatest achievements of the We-paradigm. A 
well-known example is offered by Csikszentmihalyi (1988; 1999), who proposed the connection in 
the creative production between a person (with his/her genetic pool and personal experiences), a 
field (social system) and a domain (system of symbols, related to the idea of culture). Although it 
mainly pays attention to historical creativity rather than more common instances of the 
phenomenon, this model is nonetheless essential for a We-paradigm since, as an ecological and 
systemic approach, it “recognizes the interconnectedness between the self and the environment and 
attempts to discover relations between them” (Montuori & Purser, 1995, pp. 81-82). Furthermore, 
Csikszentmihalyi (1988) repeatedly stressed the contextual and generative nature of creativity. This 
means that creativity is explicitly considered as embedded within a social and historical milieu and 
that every act of creation must start from and build upon the existing knowledge within a “domain”. 
It is because of these qualities that systems approaches in general have a great appeal for 
psychologists involved in the study of creativity and we can now find a series of successful 
applications of these perspectives (e.g., the case of families of gifted children, Moon et al., 1998). 
 
The systemic and ecological frameworks of the We-paradigm bring a series of advantages. First and 
foremost, they contextualize creative acts and give a more comprehensive account of how creativity 
takes place in all its complexity. Second, they are much better equipped to investigate both historical 
creativity (initially the He-paradigm) and everyday creativity (looked at by the I-paradigm). Third, 
on a practical note, they open a new world of opportunities for influencing creative behavior now 
conceptualized as less dependent on innate abilities and personality traits (Amabile, 1996). Despite 
these benefits, reactions against the We approach didn’t take long to materialize. Analyzing the 
social ethos in much of today’s literature on creativity, Runco (1999) fears it is misleading and that, 
in comparing social with individual factors, “it is the social factors that are not necessary for 
creativity” (p. 237). The author even proposes to separate creativity from reputation and therefore to 
cut the process from its context since this would eliminate the “social noise” affecting the inner (and 
“real”) dynamic of creativity. Needless to say, this article is intended to show that the social does 
not “perturb” creativity but allows it since, without the social context, there would be no creativity. 
In the words of Csikszentmihalyi (1988, p. 336), we must go beyond the Ptolemaic view putting the 
person in the centre of creativity in favor of a Copernican model. This is also the aim of the newest 
development within the We-paradigm: the cultural psychology of creativity.  
 
7
2. The emergence of a cultural psychology of creativity   
 
As argued above, the “social” of the We-paradigm often fails to go beyond an external-influence 
model and to see how creativity takes place within relations. In other words, the We-paradigm has to 
rightfully acknowledge the interdependence between Ego and Alter (Marková, 2003, p. xiii) in the 
creative act. This is the starting point for one of the newest perspectives in the field: the cultural 
psychology approach to creativity (see also Glăveanu, 2008; in press). It must be said that this 
discipline doesn’t aim to replace the social psychology of creativity but to build on its conclusions 
and to reveal “another side” of the We-paradigm: the social and cultural working from within the 
creative person and process. This is the contemporary retake of an old theme in creativity theory, 
what Arieti (1976) called the “individual-psychological versus the sociocultural origin of creativity” 
(p. 303). The cultural psychological position in this debate is that there is no versus between the two 
and, even more, that these two “segments” are not isolated but elements that co-constitute each 
other.  
 
Before introducing in more detail a cultural psychology framework of creativity, I will briefly 
discuss the characteristics of cultural psychology and focus on reviewing some theories or concepts 
within this discipline that address or could address the problem of creativity. 
 
2.1. Creativity and cultural psychology           
 
Not only are cultural psychology perspectives on creativity relatively recent, but cultural (or 
sociocultural) psychology itself has only (re)taken shape in the last few decades and is now not a 
unified but an emergent field. Reacting to the search for inbuilt and universal processing 
mechanisms that took over general and cross-cultural psychology after the cognitive revolution, 
cultural psychology is, in the words of Shweder (1990), a study of how “cultural traditions and 
social practices regulate, express, transform, and permute the human psyche” (p. 1). To understand 
these processes, cultural psychologists start from the basic premise of the interdependence between 
human beings and their socio-cultural context. Therefore, the focus is not on the two as separate 
entities, but on the transactions that define both of them and generate a symbolic world (Zittoun, 
2007b). This symbolic world spurs out of processes of meaning-making and co-construction of 
knowledge (Valsiner & Rosa, 2007) and this is why cultural psychology envisions human existence 
as essentially mediated through the system of symbols and norms that constitute culture. 
Consequently, the research focus in cultural psychology is on mediated action in context, on the 
sociocultural genesis of mental functions, and the analysis of everyday life (Cole, 1996, p. 104).  
 
As a paradigm that examines systemic, interactive, and mediated phenomena (Zittoun et al., 2007, 
p. 208), cultural psychology developed a specific understanding of culture described as a web of 
significance, an interworked system of construable signs, not external power but context (Geertz, 
1973). Furthermore, these meanings and symbols “stick” through time (Jovchelovitch, 2007), they 
are preserved and transmitted to new generations offering our symbolic universe a certain degree of 
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stability. Simultaneously they are open to change, elaboration and transformation through collective 
processes of action and communication. Perspectives on culture that emphasize the construction and 
use of mediators are most easily integrated by cultural psychology, for example Michael Cole’s 
(1996) understanding of culture as a system of accumulated artifacts of a group (p. 110). The 
artifact, at once material and conceptual in nature (with illustrations ranging from language to 
pottery), mediates the relation between subject and object and is a result of communication between 
self and other (persons, groups or societies).  
 
In this context, creativity both relies on the accumulated artifacts and enriches culture through the 
generation of new artifacts. As such, creative processes should constitute a key point of interest for 
the discipline of cultural psychology. While there is so far no “formally” constructed cultural 
psychology of creativity, several sociocultural directions have recently inspired empirical research 
on collaborative creativity, resulting in books (see Littleton & Miell, 2004) and journal special 
issues (see Thinking Skills and Creativity journal, 3/2008). At a theoretical level, different traditions 
within cultural psychology can be built upon in constructing a cultural psychology of creativity and, 
from them, the cultural-historical Russian school, and especially the writings of Lev Vygotsky, are 
particularly relevant. As one of the father figures of cultural psychology, Vygotsky (1960/1997) 
pointed to the importance of cultural mediation through tools and signs for the development of all 
higher mental functions. Vygotsky’s early work on imagination and creativity in childhood 
(1930/1998) laid the foundations for a cultural approach to creativity by asserting that: 1) creativity 
exists in the everyday and not only in great historical works, and 2) every creator is a product of 
his/her time and environment. What transpires from the cultural-historical perspective is that 
creators use culturally constructed symbols and tools to produce new cultural artifacts (see also 
Moran & John-Steiner, 2003). Furthermore, Vygotsky was primarily interested in the ontogenesis 
and microgenesis of creativity and in creativity as a process occurring in real-life “collaborations” 
(like those between child and adult). It is because of these preoccupations that the Vygotskian 
perspective remains central to any cultural perspective on creativity and this includes the proposed 
framework to be discussed further in the article. This framework also combines ideas from several 
lines of thought, three of which are briefly presented below: Winnicott and the notion of potential 
space, dialogicality and creativity as dialogue, and the everyday use of symbolic resources.    
      
Similar to Vygotsky, who proposed “that creative imagination develops from children’s symbolic 
play interactions with caregivers” (Smolucha, 1992, p. 51), Donald Winnicott (1971) developed an 
important thesis claiming that creativity and cultural experience are twinborn in the potential or 
transitional space through creative playing in early childhood. The notion of potential space, central 
to the conception of the author, is that of a relational space “between the individual and the 
environment” (p. 100), a space of experiencing the world situated between inner self and external 
life, a notion that came to be equated with the area of intersubjectivity. Creativity therefore has a 
strong social basis as it emerges primarily in a relationship, that between the mother and the child. 
Besides establishing creativity as relational, Winnicott’s account can be considered an excellent 
theoretization of everyday creativity in its most basic expression. For him, creativity is not 
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embodied in products but it is primarily a process, what he described as “creative living”, a healthy 
way of living that leaves room for personal expression and spontaneity.  
 
If Winnicott’s account can give us an idea of where creativity is located, and that is in the space of 
interrelations, we further need to understand how exactly creativity emerges in relations and it is 
here where notions of dialogue and dialogicality become instrumental.  
 
“Dialogue is the meeting ground on which new questions are raised, the mating ground on 
which new combinations are found, and the testing ground in which novelties are critically 
evaluated and assimilated into the body of shared knowledge and thought” (Gruber, 1998, p. 
139). 
 
Continuing his argument, Gruber asserts that all creativity requires, at least at certain points in the 
process, some form of communication or social exchange. This is not only applicable to explicit 
moments of social interaction since for the cultural psychologist the human mind is dialogical, 
meaning that it can “conceive, create and communicate about social realities in terms of the ‘Alter’” 
(Marková, 2003, p. xiii). The relevance of this perspective is supported by Barrett (1999) who 
recognized knowledge creation, therefore both thinking and creativity, as inherently social-
dialogical processes. This means that, even when we are alone and apparently creating in complete 
solitude, we are still engaged in dialogue with internalized “parties” such as our mentors, our 
audience, our critics, etc.  In the words of Negus and Pickering (2004, p. 23), creativity entails a 
communicative experience, intersubjectivity and interactive dialogue. This dialogue is made 
possible by the use of cultural elements and it is these elements that constitute the substance of our 
creative acts. The question remains of when we are more likely to use cultural elements in a creative 
manner. 
 
This leads us, finally, to the notion of symbolic resources as developed by T. Zittoun (2007a; 
2007b). The main thesis of this conception is that whenever people find themselves facing a 
discontinuity, a break or rupture of their taken-for-granted ordinary experience (of their inner self, of 
the relations with others or the environment), they engage in processes specific to “transitions” and 
resort to symbolic resources to elaborate meaning and externalize the outcome (Zittoun et al., 2003; 
Zittoun, 2007b). Needless to say this outcome (not necessarily material) is most often creative, 
especially since it comes out of a situation where there is no learned or practiced solution (Torrance, 
1988). To qualify as a symbolic resource, the element must be used by someone for something, 
usually re-contextualizing meaning into a newly resulting socio-cultural formation (Zittoun et al., 
2003, p. 418). Symbolic resources vary in nature, from concrete artifacts to conceptual and 
procedural elements. All symbolic resources emerge from social interaction (Zittoun, 2007a) and 
require a symbolic labor, the necessary work in the terms of Willis (1990, p. 9) “to ensure the daily 
production and reproduction of human existence”. 
 
From the perspectives outlined above, some conclusions can be drawn about the cultural psychology 
conceptualization of creativity: 1) it considers creative acts as socio-cultural in nature and origin; 
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2) it stresses the role of intersubjectivity and dialogical interaction in the creative expression and 3) 
it looks at how cultural symbolic elements come to form the texture of new and creative products. 
All these basic premises are therefore at the core of the creativity framework discussed in the next 
section. 
 
2.2. A cultural psychology framework for creativity and its implications 
 
2.2.1. Definition and theoretical framework 
 
As mentioned earlier, until now no “cultural psychology of creativity” has been formally 
constructed as such. Reviewed before were nonetheless important theoretical leads that could 
support such a construction. A cultural definition of creativity would need to take into account the 
social embedment of creative acts as well as their relation to cultural resources. In the literature on 
creativity some of these features tend to appear in a number of definitions:  
 
“a creative individual solves problems, fashions products, or poses new questions within a 
domain in a way that is initially considered to be unusual but is eventually accepted within at 
least one cultural group” (Gardner, 1994, p. 145). 
 
“I define creativity as activity that produces something new through the recombination and 
transformation of existing cultural practices or forms” (Liep, 2001, p. 2).  
 
“Much human creativity is social, arising from activities that take place in a context in which 
interaction with other people and the artifacts that embody collective knowledge are essential 
contributors” (Fischer et al., 2005, p.  482). 
 
Supported by these formulations, I will define creativity from a cultural perspective as a complex 
socio-cultural-psychological process that, through working with “culturally-impregnated” 
materials within an intersubjective space, leads to the generation of artifacts that are evaluated as 
new and significant by one or more persons or communities at a given time. As seen from before, 
the socio-cultural-psychological process is a dialogical one, the “culturally-impregnated” materials 
are symbolic resources (signs and tools from a Vygotskian perspective) used in creative acts, and the 
intersubjective space is a potential space, between creator and community. Adopting this definition 
opens up a new world of possibilities for studying creativity without individualizing it or looking 
exclusively at its cognitive aspects. In fact, the cultural psychology of creativity as proposed here 
“puts” creativity into a tetradic framework depicted in Figure 1: 
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FIGURE 1. A proposed cultural framework of creativity 
 
In this framework, the new artifact (material or conceptual) is seen as emerging within the relation 
between self (creator) and others (broadly understood as a community), all three being immersed 
into and in dialogue with an existing body of cultural artifacts, symbols and established norms. This 
model is not structural but dynamic since it is in the “tensions” between all four elements that 
creativity takes shape with the “new artifact” becoming part of “existing culture” (for self and/or 
community) and constantly alimenting the creative cycle. As Zittoun and collaborators (2003, p. 
441) suggest, “with the use of symbolic resources, there is always something produced, something 
externalized, which is attached to the producer primarily by the gaze of the other”. This implies the 
strong links between the creative outcome and the identity of the creator(s), as well as the role of the 
other in constructing this identity. At the same time, creativity could not exist outside of our relation 
with other people within a cultural setting since every new artifact needs constant meaning-making 
processes that make sense of it and this becomes possible only by using what Buner (1990) calls 
interpretative procedures. What is of key importance in the cultural psychology approach is that 
these interpretations are always context-dependent (Montuori & Purser, 1995) and therefore there is 
no “real” or “objective” creativity, but one that is constructed within communities, in relation to 
authors and creative products.    
 
Another conclusion derived from this framework is that creativity is a generative process; it is 
connected to previous knowledge and cultural repertoires and in a dialogical relationship with the 
“old” or the “already-there”. Any innovative idea or object never comes out ex nihilo, as in the 
romantic visions of the genius specific to the He-paradigm. This aspect has been recognized early on 
in the literature, the fact that “human creativity uses what is already existing and available and 
changes it in unpredictable ways” (Arieti, 1976, p. 4; see also Liep, 2001; Hennessey, 2003a; Negus 
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& Pickering, 2004). Moreover, a history of misconception of what tradition is needs to be 
challenged. In the creativity framework above, tradition and previous knowledge are part and parcel 
of the creative process, since, as Feldman (1974, p. 68) notes, “all creative thought springs from a 
base of cultural knowledge and is therefore, by definition, part of a cultural tradition -- even when it 
breaks with tradition”. Furthermore, tradition itself is not a pre-given, singular, rigid and abstract 
cultural entity (Negus & Pickering, 2004); creativity and tradition are interpenetrated and, in all 
cases, the emergence and meaning of innovation is bound up with tradition (Wilson, 1984).  
 
Alongside these theoretical considerations, the cultural psychology framework presented above has 
a potentially great impact on creativity research. The problems under the scrutiny of sociocultural 
psychologists correspond to the four composing elements of the tetradic framework and their 
interrelations. For example, when looking at the creative “self”, the author(s) of the creative 
outcome, one central aspect to be investigated has to do with identity and especially “creative 
identities”, how they are constructed, re-constructed and manifested while performing the creative 
task and outside of it. When focusing on “others”, or the community/communities creators are in 
dialogue with, it would be interesting to observe how members of different communities assess the 
creativity of one and the same artifact. Changing to “previous knowledge”, one immediate question 
is how it is used in the creative act, what artifacts from our cultural repertoires become activated, 
turning into symbolic resources that sustain the creative activity, and how they combine in order to 
generate a novel output. This leads to the “new artifact” and the meaning-making processes taking 
place around the “new”, how it is understood by both creator, community and maybe society at 
large, how is it anchored and made familiar (to use a social representations theory terminology; 
Moscovici, 2000), and how it becomes part of the existing set of artifacts allowing further creative 
cycles to take place. Above all, what should come to the front are the dialogical connections 
between self and other, previous knowledge and new artifact, that are considered in any cultural 
research in their unity, as a dynamic and ecological whole.   
 
Principally, what distinguishes cultural research on creativity is the emic perspective on the 
phenomenon (see Smith & Bond, 1998). This ultimately means that researchers are advised to go to 
the field with the least amount of preconceptions about what creativity is or should be and to 
connect to the local ways of sense-making specific to the setting they are investigating. An emic-
oriented researcher would be very careful in applying “scientific” Western notions of creativity to 
other places in the world (for a discussion see Westwood & Low, 2003, p. 237-238). Consequently 
social “constructions” of what a certain creative outcome is, how creative it is and, above all, what 
creativity is, are all to be carefully collected from participants in order to capture how both the 
“image” and “manifestation” of creativity are interrelated in any particular cultural setting. 
2.2.2. Relevance and implications of the cultural psychology framework 
 
The cultural psychology of creativity and, more specifically, the tetradic framework discussed 
above, represent a proposition for a novel approach to creativity rather than a definite theory. It is a 
work in progress that, despite its general and abstract formulation at this stage, could greatly 
improve our understanding of creativity. The present article tries to put forward a broad formulation 
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of a cultural psychology of creativity that draws from both sociocultural theories (notions of 
artifacts and symbolic resources, the theory of dialogicality, etc.) and social, systemic models of 
creativity. What both perspectives have in common is a rejection of an individualistic and 
reductionist view of creativity as a purely individual phenomenon and an emphasis put on the role 
of self-other relations in creative acts.  
 
In this regard, using a cultural psychology approach improves existing social-psychological 
accounts by going beyond the perspective of the social as an environment that constrains or 
facilitates creative acts. Creativity is not simply “conditioned” by social factors, its mere nature is 
relational since it could not exist outside of cultural resources and dialogical relations. Furthermore, 
the tetradic framework elaborates further current systemic models like that of Csikszentmihalyi by 
using a broader conceptualization of the “field” (social structures) and the “domain” (cultural 
structures). While systemic models are useful for the analysis of socially valuable creations (cases of 
historical creativity), the cultural model aims to be relevant for the study of different forms of 
creativity, from “minor” creative expressions to revolutionary creations. In order to accomplish this, 
it conceives the field and domain in a more flexible and less “institutional” manner. The “field”, 
seen as a group of experts allowing or not the creation to enter a certain domain, is only a particular 
instance of the possible role “others” play in the process of creativity. The notion of 
“other/community” used in the tetradic framework therefore allows us to capture more facets of the 
“other”: from persons in the vicinity of the creator to the members of different social groups the 
creator is part of, and, finally, to the institutions that validate a work as being creative or not. 
Similarly, the “domain” is more than a structured field of knowledge (like a scientific branch or an 
artistic discipline for example) that will, in the end, incorporate or reject the creation. The notion of 
“existing artifacts/culture” I made reference to in the cultural framework incorporates all forms of 
material and symbolic resources that inform the creative process and these can be drawn from 
several “domains” as well as common-sense knowledge. More fundamentally, what the cultural 
psychology perspective advocates for is the multiplicity of “fields” and “domains” a person engages 
within any form of creative activity and the necessity of studying as many levels of the “social and 
cultural” context of the phenomenon as possible in order to have a more comprehensive 
understanding of each particular situation. The theoretical position of cultural psychology sets two 
specific and interrelated goals for any sociocultural approach to creativity: 1) to unpack the 
microgenesis of creativity in community settings and 2) to operate with a contextual definition of 
creativity, dependent upon “local” or “folk” notions of creativity. 
 
These two aims have a series of consequences for how we theorize and study creativity. The 
theoretical implication involves a reconceptualization of the levels of creativity by locating all of 
them at a community level. Deriving from this, the practical implication refers to creativity 
assessment and the need for a more ecological and contextualized way of appreciating creative 
outcomes. Both of these are discussed as follows.     
 
From a cultural psychology perspective, thinking in terms of polarities such as P-creativity (creative 
for the person) and H-creativity (creative for society) (Boden, 1994), creativity in the small and 
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mature creativity (Cohen & Ambrose, 1999) or, respectively, “little c” and “big C” (Paulus & 
Nijstad, 2003), is generally misleading. From the beginning these suggest a hierarchy in creativity 
that often trivializes the notion of everyday creativity (Bateson, 1999). Second, although it is largely 
acknowledged nowadays that there is a continuum in creative expression (for steps in this 
continuum see Cohen & Ambrose, 1999), the habit of dichotomizing creativity can only disconnect 
the different modalities of being creative. Finally, this polarization also opens the risk of unwillingly 
promoting the “dissolution” of creativity either by considering every human act as creative or by 
setting standards for creativity so high that the vast majority of people could never reach it (Negus 
& Pickering, 2004). What solution is there?  
 
A possible answer, reflective of the cultural psychology approach, is to acknowledge the social and 
cultural roots of all types of creative expression, from personal to historical. From this perspective, 
although there are numerous differences between the works of art of an established modernist 
painter and the drawings of a toddler, in the end they both emerge within a social context and from 
the use of cultural means. Creativity always takes place in a community and the creative outcome is 
generally of interest for multiple communities. This helps us “relocate” creativity from the extremes 
(person or society) to the “middle” and, by this, to give it a more sensible position (Glăveanu, in 
press; a similar argument has been recently supported by Eteläpelto & Lahti, 2008). As mentioned 
earlier, the notion of “field” from systemic models of creativity takes on a new meaning when social 
groups are theorized as communities. A community is not understood only in its topographical sense 
or as a local social system; it necessarily requires the existence of communion, of close ties and the 
feeling of belongingness between its members (see Urry, 2007) and can describe different social 
realities, from small groups to organizations and larger social structures. Communities exist where 
they are felt and experienced as such (Jovchelovitch, 2007). Most importantly, communities support 
their own culture (Duveen, 2007) and it is in communities that people find not only the resources 
they need to create but also the “parameters” for making sense of the world (Jovchelovitch, 2007) 
and all its creative, new artifacts.   
 
This last suggestion has direct implications for assessing creativity. As repeatedly argued, “the 
creativity of an idea depends not just on the content of the idea but the way in which that idea is 
developed, presented and interpreted” (Bilton, 2007, p. 6). This fact is stressed by most definitions 
of creativity (see Stein, 1962; Gardner, 1994; Fischer et al., 2005). The argument that “creativity is 
socially defined” (Nijstad & Paulus, 2003, p. 339), gives even more impetus to social and cultural 
psychologists in showing that there would be no creativity without others to appreciate it as such. In 
fact, what this approach argues is that creativity is not inherent to artifacts or persons but it is 
socially attributed to them. Furthermore, all judgments about creativity are historically located and 
there is no “view from nowhere”, an absolute statement about what is or is not creative. 
Understanding how and why different social groups attribute creativity differently (or similarly) is 
one of the main tasks of a cultural psychology of creativity. And this is because being creative 
always means being creative for someone (person, group, society) at a particular time and place. 
Under these circumstances, the traditional practice of assessing creativity with the use of experts, 
trained persons able to offer “informed” opinions, offers only a partial picture. This practice 
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contributes further to associating creativity only with certain types of “specialist” fields, like art, 
technology or science. It presupposes working with pre-set and universal definitions of creativity 
therefore adopting an etic stand, as opposed to an emic one, open to the local (personal and/or 
community) understandings of what is and is not creative.  
 
But, as Amabile (1996) comes to demonstrate through her Consensual Assessment Technique (also 
Hennessey, 2003b), there is generally no need for already made definitions. The basic assumption of 
this method is that appropriate observers (again usually with some formal training in the field) 
implicitly work with similar notions about what is creative, despite the fact that they are not 
formalized or given. Without getting into its details, this technique is based on the idea of 
consensus, of converging beliefs and perceptions about creativity.  
 
From a cultural psychology perspective, creativity assessment should be as “ecological” as possible 
and rely on multiple feedback at the cost of getting diverging opinions (and, to an extent, pursuing 
exactly that). More precisely, creative products and processes should be assessed by members of 
significant or relevant communities, which are those “affected” by or in contact with the creative 
work, as well as the creator himself. To take an example, a teenager’s artwork should not be subject 
only to expert judgments (persons trained in art), but also to the judgment of peers, parents, teachers 
and members from other groups and communities that get to see the creative productions or are 
generally interested in art (from other artists to potential buyers). Since the creative outcome 
requires meaning-making processes and these, in their turn, depend on the particular socio-cultural 
circumstances of the persons attributing meaning, the “multiple feedback” is often less consensual 
but far more useful, including for the teenager in our example. The importance of this perspective 
resides in its simultaneous focus, in real-life contexts, on a) the reasons behind attributions of 
creativity by several social actors, b) the functions these attributions serve and c) the consequences 
they have on both creator and creative process. This technique certainly does not aim to promote the 
idea that higher consensus between different groups would validate something as being “in reality” 
creative because the search for this kind of “ultimate” and “objective” statements goes against the 
constructionist nature of the investigation. It also does not reject scientific or expert appreciations 
about the creativity of certain outcomes but considers them as one form of assessment among 
others, coming from non-expert but nevertheless relevant groups of persons connected in one way or 
another to the “creation”. Since the meaning-making processes around creativity and their link to 
particular social milieus are paramount, there is no hierarchy of viewpoints to be established.         
 
3. Concluding remarks about the future of the We-paradigm  
 
As argued in this article, there are three major paradigms that have shaped and continue to influence 
the trajectory of creativity in psychology. Historically, individualistic approaches constitute the 
norm, locating creativity either inside “unique” individuals (the He-paradigm) or inside each and 
every person taken separately (the I-paradigm). It is only in the last decades that more emphasis has 
been put on the role of social factors in the creative process. These are the first signs of a new 
paradigm, the We-paradigm, aiming to develop more systemic approaches of creativity, 
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comprehensive views that incorporate multiple levels, from individuals and interpersonal 
interactions, to groups and cultures (Simonton, 2003, p. 320). And yet, the whole project of the We-
paradigm may be derailed by letting the theoretization go only half-way. This “incomplete” vision 
sees the social and cultural as coercive instances, as an environment that has the power to facilitate 
or inhibit creative expression. In the end, the person still sits “alone”, self-contained and self-
sufficient, ready to confront the “system” and, if “creative enough”, to defeat it.  
 
In this context, the cultural psychology of creativity advocated here tries to take a step forward in 
consolidating the We-paradigm. For those looking for universalistic claims and “fit-all” models of 
creativity, this approach will be disappointing. It has no “formulas” (Littleton & Miell, 2004, p. 2) 
and promotes the contextual and situated study of creative acts, persons and communities. What the 
cultural psychology of creativity will have to offer are, first and foremost, research examples of 
“good-practice” and theoretical approaches that try to see creativity in all its complexity. This new 
direction also brings with it practical consequences outside of the scientific realm. One has already 
been formulated by Montuori and Purser (1995, p. 104): a shift in our cultural project of dominating 
the environment to nurturing and engendering creative relationships within it. It is a reminder of our 
responsibility as community members to build spaces for dialogue and creativity for both self and 
others, of the fact that, living interconnected with other people, our creative expression could and 
should be able to fertilize the common soil of creativity around us. 
 
It is hard to make predictions about the direction in which creativity theory will move. While the 
future of the We-paradigm is hard to anticipate, and it probably too early to be anticipated, the 
future of creativity in psychology is sure to be looking bright. For as long as psychologists find 
creativity instrumental for our adaptability, self-expression, and health (Runco, 2004), it will 
continue to attract the interest of both theorists and researchers. But we should remember that 
creativity also exists beyond psychology. As Magyari-Beck (1999) argues when describing the new 
science of Creatology, the nature of creativity research is increasingly cross-disciplinary bringing 
together psychologists, sociologists, artists, educators, historians, managers, economists, etc. under a 
common enterprise. Perhaps at this broader level the We-paradigm will become more rapidly 
influential and sociocultural psychologists could play a key role in this future development.  
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